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This paper examines the extent of state dependence in individual unemployment and
low paid employment and the inter-related dynamics between the two. Evidence is
presented that (after controlling for unobserved heterogeneity and initial conditions)
the low paid are more likely to become unemployed and the unemployed more likely
to be low paid on re-entry to employment. The impacts of unemployment and low
pay are found to be insigni…cantly di¤erent from one another, both on the probability
of unemployment in the next period and on the probability of low pay. Evidence is
presented that low paid jobs act as the main conduit for repeat unemployment and
considerably increase its probability. Those who get a better paid job eliminate the
increased risk of repeat unemployment.
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A signi…cant proportion of the unemployed who get re–employed lose their jobs again
fairly quickly.1 For Britain the existing evidence suggests that this is in large part due
to strong state dependence in individual unemployment experience.2 That is to say,
experiencing unemployment of itself makes future unemployment more likely. How-
ever we know little about the mechanism that lies behind this observed persistence.
This paper argues that a large part of the reason for the persistence is the quality of
the jobs that re-entrants get, which tend to be low paid and unstable, what might
be labelled “dead–end” jobs. This means that a fuller picture of the dynamics of
unemployment is provided by examining it in conjunction with the type of job taken
when an exit from unemployment occurs.
There is also evidence of similarly strong persistence in low pay.3 Someone who is
low paid in one period is far more likely to be low paid in the following period than
someone higher up the pay distribution, even after controlling for other observable
factors and for the endogenous selection or initial conditions problem that this com-
parison involves. As with the persistence in unemployment, we know less about the
mechanism that lies behind this observed persistence. As well as this persistence in
both unemployment and low pay, there is also evidence of a link between them giving
a “low pay – no pay cycle”.4 The low paid are more likely to become unemployed in
the future, the unemployed are more likely to be low paid on re–entry to employment,
and this probability of being low paid rises even further if the individual was low paid
before becoming unemployed.5 How much of this is due to heterogeneity remains
an open question. This paper studies these inter-related dynamics of low pay and
unemployment.
Any “scarring” e¤ects of unemployment are generally viewed as resulting from the
non–accumulation of new (and the deterioration of existing) human capital during
an unemployment spell and from adverse selection. Stewart (1999c) puts forward the
hypothesis, on the basis of the evidence described in the previous paragraph, that
certain low paid jobs may have similar “scarring” e¤ects to unemployment on an
individual’s future labour market prospects.
1See for example Clark and Summers (1979) and Layard et al. (1991). The unemployed claimant
count …gures for Britain indicate that about half of those leaving the count return within a year
(Sweeney, 1996). This …gure has remained fairly constant throughout the 1980s and 1990s (Teasdale,
1998).
2See Arulampalam et al. (2000) and Narendranathan and Elias (1993). In contrast the evidence
for the US suggests a lack of state dependence. See Heckman and Borjas (1980) and Corcoran and
Hill (1980).
3See Stewart and Swa¢eld (1997, 1999). There is also an extensive literature on wage persistence
and wage dynamics in general, not focusing speci…cally on the bottom end of the distribution. See
Atkinson et al. (1992) for a survey and Mo¢tt and Gottschalk (1993), Baker (1997) and Dickens
(2000) for recent contributions.
4Stewart and Swa¢eld (1997), Stewart(1999a), Gregg and Leonardi (1999).
5For the US there is considerable evidence of signi…cant and long-lasting earnings losses associated
with job displacement. (See Jacobson et al., 1993, Stevens, 1997 and Kletzer, 1998, inter alia.) In
addition Stevens in particular stresses the likelihood and important impact of additional job losses
subsequent to the initial displacement. For Britain Gregg and Wadsworth (1996), Gregory and
Jukes (1997) and Gregg et al. (1999) present evidence of a negative impact of unemployment on
subsequent earnings.
1While the hypothesis as stated above views jobs only in terms of their pay levels,
distinguishing between low paid and higher paid jobs, this may be viewed as just one
dimension of the “good jobs / bad jobs” debate (Burtless et al., 1990, Acemoglu,
1997). Similarly Layard et al. (1990), who make extensive use in their analysis of a
two–sector model, argue that “employers o¤ering good jobs may well use a person’s
current position as a screening device. While unemployment is a bad signal, being in
a low–quality job may well be a worse one” (Layard et al., 1990, page 249). The two
sectors, or the good job / bad job divide, may be viewed as resulting from e¢ciency
wages or an insider / outsider context. In the segmented labour market literature it
is hypothesised that “bad” jobs may have a “scarring” e¤ect on future employment
prospects, allowing skills to deteriorate and thereby reducing future earnings (see
Taubman and Wachter, 1986). McCormick (1990) terms these “stigmatized” jobs
and argues that faced by uncertainty about worker quality, …rms use job type held
(be it “good” vs. “bad” or skilled vs. unskilled), alongside unemployment duration
(Blanchard and Diamond, 1994), as a cheap indicator of future productivity. This
works in equilibrium because high productivity workers …nd “bad” jobs more costly
and so are prepared to invest in moving quickly to a new “good” job.
This paper examines the extent to which “bad” jobs have “scarring” e¤ects on fu-
ture employment and wage prospects, alongside those of unemployment. The econo-
metric models used allow for unobserved (as well as observed) heterogeneity and
inter-related dynamics and explicitly model initial conditions.
2 Probabilities of unemployment and low pay
This section describes the data used in the paper and conducts a preliminary exami-
nation of the conditional probabilities of being unemployed and of being in a low paid
job that the data display. The data used in the paper are from the …rst six waves of the
British Household Panel Survey (BHPS), covering 1991–1996. The BHPS contains
a nationally representative sample of households whose members are re-interviewed
each year.6 The sample used here contains only Original Sample Members (OSMs),
is restricted to those aged between 18 and the state retirement age7 and excludes
full-time students.
The raw (or aggregate) probabilities of unemployment and low pay for various
groups distinguished by status at t ¡1 are presented in Table 1. The unemployment
indicator used is based on the ILO/OECD de…nition of unemployment. Under this
de…nition a person is unemployed if he or she does not have a job, but had looked for
work in the past four weeks and is available for work.8 The table shows that there is
considerable persistence in unemployment in terms of the raw data. The conditional
probabilities in the …rst column of Table 1, based on data pooled over the years
6See Taylor (1996) for details.
765 for men and 60 for women.
8An individual is classi…ed as having a job if they did any work for pay or pro…t during the week
prior to interview (for any number of hours and including casual work) - either as an employee or
self employed. They are also classi…ed as employed if they had a job that they were away from that
week or were waiting to take up a job already obtained. Looking for work includes “registration
at employment agency, approaching employers, checking ads, making enquiries” and also includes
looking for a government scheme.
21992 to 1996, exhibit a strong association between present and past unemployment.
The …rst row of the table gives the unconditional probability of being unemployed
at a point in time.9 The aggregate probability is about 0.07. This is made up of a
probability of about 0.08 for men and about 0.06 for women. The remainder of the
table gives conditional probabilities on the basis of status at t¡1 (i.e. at the previous
interview – roughly 12 months previously10).
The second and third rows give the conditional probabilities for those out of and
in the labour force respectively at t ¡ 1. It is clear that the probability of being
unemployed currently is much higher for those who were out of the labour force at
the previous interview (roughly 12 months previously) than for those who were in the
labour force (employed or unemployed).11 For those out of the labour force at t ¡ 1
(but in at t) the probability of being unemployed at t is 0.37, compared with 0.05 for
those who were in the labour force (employed or unemployed) at t ¡ 1.
Among those in the labour force at t ¡ 1, the next two rows of the table then
partition the sample into those who were unemployed at the previous survey and
those who were employed. The conditional probability of current unemployment is
considerably higher for the former group than the latter (0.46 against 0.03). The …nal
row of this block of the table gives the ratio of these two probabilities. Someone who
was unemployed at the previous survey date is 16.8 times as likely to be unemployed
at the date of the current interview as someone who was employed at the previous
interview. This ratio of conditional probabilities can be viewed as a measure of the
persistence in the probability of unemployment. The …gures for men and women are
fairly similar (16.4 and 15.9 respectively), despite both conditional probabilities being
quite a bit lower for women.
Part, or even all, of this persistence may be due to heterogeneity. The probability
of unemployment is higher for the young, for those without quali…cations, for those
with poor health, etc. Even if there were no structural persistence for individuals,
this heterogeneity would cause the group of individuals unemployed at the previous
date to have a higher aggregate probability of unemployment at the current date than
those who were employed.
By way of preliminary analysis, the …rst column of Table 2 presents the results of
…tting a simple pooled Probit model (1992–1996) including the previous state as one
of the covariates. Unobserved heterogeneity, considered in the next section, is ignored
here. De…ning a binary variable yit = 1 if individual i is unemployed at t and yit = 0
if employed at t the probabilities of unemployment and employment are speci…ed as:
P [yitjxit;yit¡1] = ©[(x
0
it¯ + °yit¡1)(2yit ¡ 1)] (1)
where © is the cumulative distribution function of a standard normal random variable.
As additional covariates I include years of education, whether the individual has any
quali…cations, a quadratic in years of experience, gender and marital status (and the
interaction between them), health status, whether resident in London or the South
East and the local unemployment-vacancy ratio.
9Conditional on being in the labour force (i.e. either employed or unemployed) at t, but uncon-
ditional in the sense of not being conditioned on status at t ¡ 1.
1072% of the pooled sample are interviewed less than 30 days either side of the anniversary of the
previous interview, 91% within 2 months.
11Again the sample for these probabilities is restricted to those who are in the labour force at t.
3This model can be used to calculate predicted probabilities of current unemploy-
ment given unemployment at the previous survey date and given employment at the
that date, but with otherwise identical observed characteristics (i.e. x’s). There are
a number of ways of calculating simple summary measures of these probabilities (the
usual index number problem). The one used here, though non-standard, both has
intuitive appeal and is easily extendable to the models described in Section 3 be-
low. The two probabilities of interest are evaluated at a value of x0¯ that gives the
probability of unemployment at t given employment at t¡1 equal to the correspond-
ing sample proportion. More formally, de…ne p0 to be the sample proportion who
have yit = 1 among those with yit¡1 = 0. Then the evaluation can be conducted at
x0¯ = ©¡1(p0). For someone with characteristics corresponding to this value, the pre-
dicted probability given employment at t¡1 is simply p0 and the predicted probability
given unemployment at t ¡ 1 is given by
^ p1 = ©[^ ° + ©
¡1(p0)]: (2)






For the probability of unemployment, this gives an estimated probability ratio of
15.5. (The table also gives the corresponding unadjusted ratio of conditional proba-
bilities on the same sample.12) Thus, despite their importance in terms of statistical
and numerical signi…cance, controlling for the covariates listed above reduces the ex-
tent of the measured persistence in unemployment very little. Someone unemployed
at the previous survey date is still 15.5 times as likely to be unemployed currently as
someone who was employed at the previous date, but otherwise has the same values
of the characteristics listed.
Turning to the probability of being low paid, the second column of Table 1 presents
raw (or aggregate) conditional probabilities based on a low pay threshold of £3.50
per hour in April 1997 terms.13 This threshold classi…es around 10% of employees as
low paid.14 The lower block of the column indicates that the probability of being low
paid currently is much higher for those who were low paid at the time of the previous
interview (roughly 12 months previously) than for those who were paid above the
threshold (0.57 against 0.03). Those low paid at t ¡ 1 are 16.8 times as likely to be
low paid at t as someone higher paid at t ¡ 1. As for unemployment, the impact
of observed heterogeneity on this measure of persistence is examined using a pooled
Probit model. The results are given in the third column of Table 2. Once again
controlling for the same covariates reduces the extent of the measured persistence
only very slightly. Someone low paid at the previous survey date is still 14.1 times as
likely to be low paid currently as someone who was higher paid at the previous date,
but otherwise has the same values of the characteristics listed at the foot of Table 2.
12The value di¤ers slightly from that in Table 1, since the samples used in Table 2 exclude
observations with missing values on the covariates listed above (and at the foot of the table).
13Pay is de…ned in terms of average hourly earnings and is adjusted to April 1997 terms using
the Average Earnings Index. This threshold is the main de…nition of low pay used by the Low Pay
Commission in their analysis of low pay in the UK (LPC, 1998).
14A national minimum wage was introduced in April 1999 at £3.60 per hour for those aged 22
and over. There are lower rates of £3.00 for those aged 18–21 (inclusive) and £3.20 for those aged
22 and over on accredited training within the …rst 6 months of a new job with a new employer.
4Summary descriptive statistics to illustrate the “low pay – no pay cycle” are also
presented in Tables 1 and 2. The lower block of the …rst column of Table 1 indicates
that employees who were low paid at t ¡ 1 are 2.7 times as likely to be unemployed
at t as those who were higher paid at t¡1. The second column of Table 2 shows that
controlling for the same characteristics as before changes this ratio very little.
The upper block of the second column of Table 1 indicates that those unemployed
at t¡1 are 3 times as likely to be low paid at t (given employment) as those employed
at t¡1. This means that they are about half as likely as those who were low paid at
t ¡ 1 and about 8 times as likely as those who were higher paid at t ¡ 1. As above,
these …gures are altered little by controlling for the same characteristics as before –
results of which are given in the fourth column of Table 2.
Thus in terms of aggregate conditional probabilities, there is considerable persis-
tence in both unemployment and low paid employment. In addition the aggregate
dynamic processes are inter-related, in the sense that the current probability of each
depends on the past occurrence of the other, meaning that in terms of aggregate
probabilities there is evidence of a “low pay – no pay cycle”. None of the probability
ratios are reduced much by allowing for observed heterogeneity in some of the more
obvious variables that in‡uence these probabilities.
3 Unobserved heterogeneity and initial conditions
The results of the preliminary data examination in the previous section do not take
account of unobserved heterogeneity or initial conditions. If the unobserved hetero-
geneity exhibits persistence over time, then ignoring it will lead to an overstatement
of the true persistence or state dependence in unemployment and low pay. This issue
is the focus of attention in this section. Two contrasting models and estimation meth-
ods are used to address the problem. Section 3.1 outlines a dynamic random e¤ects
probit model for a binary outcome and an estimation approach proposed by Heckman
(1981) and used recently by Arulampalam et al. (2000). In Section 4 this model is
applied sequentially to the probability of being unemployed and the probability of
being low paid (given employment). Applying the model in this way ignores the pos-
sible selection bias in conditioning on employment when analysing the probability of
being low paid. This is analogous to the common practice of treating the selection on
employment as exogenous when estimating a wage equation. This issue is discussed
further when the results are presented in Section 4 below.
The dynamic random e¤ects probit model outlined in Section 3.1 requires an
auxiliary distributional assumption on the individual-speci…c e¤ects. To investigate
the potential sensitivity of the results to this assumption an alternative approach is
also used involving GMM estimation of a dynamic linear probability model. This is
outlined in Section 3.2.
53.1 A dynamic random e¤ects probit model





it¯ + °yit¡1 + "i + uit (4)
(i = 1;:::;N;t = 2;:::;T) with uit » N(0;¾2
u), where y¤
it is a measure of the
propensity toward a particular labour market state (unemployed vs. employed or






The subscript i indexes individuals and t time periods. N is large, but T is small
and …xed. Asymptotics are on N alone. The composite error term contains two
components, " and u. Although the uit are assumed iid, the composite error term
will be correlated over time due to the individual–speci…c time–invariant " terms.
In the basic form of the model it is assumed that "i » iidN and independent of
uit for all i and t. In the standard (uncorrelated) random e¤ects model "i is also
assumed uncorrelated with xit. Alternatively, following Mundlak (1978) and Cham-
berlain (1984), the possibility that the unobserved "i are correlated with the observed
characteristics in the model can be allowed for by assuming a linear relationship be-




ia + ®i (6)
where ®i » iidN(0;¾2
®) and independent of xit and uit for all i and t. Thus the latent





it¯ + °yit¡1 + ®i + uit (7)
(i = 1;:::;N;t = 2;:::;T) where, to reduce notation changes, the time means or
lags and leads have been subsumed into the x-vector.
If the composite error in this equation is written as vit = ®i + uit, the individual-
speci…c random e¤ects speci…cation adopted implies that the correlation between the
vit in any two (di¤erent) periods will be the same:






t;s = 2;:::;T;t 6= s (8)
To estimate the model an assumption is required about the initial observations,
yi1, and in particular about their relationship with the unobserved heterogeneity com-
ponent, ®i. The assumption giving rise to the simplest form of model for estimation
is to take the initial conditions, yi1, to be exogenous. This would be appropriate if
the start of the process coincided with the start of the observation period for each
individual, but will not be valid for the type of process being considered in this pa-
per. Under this assumption the likelihood can be decomposed into two independent
factors, the …rst giving the joint probability for t = 2;:::;T and the second that for
t = 1, and the …rst can be maximised without reference to the second. In this case
estimation can be conducted using a standard Random E¤ects Probit program. If
6the initial conditions are correlated with the ®i, as we would expect in the current
context, this method of estimation will overstate the degree of state dependence, °
(see for example Chay and Hyslop, 1998).
The approach to the initial conditions problem proposed by Heckman (1981) and
adopted here involves specifying a linearised reduced form equation for the initial





i1¼ + ´i (9)
where zi1 is a vector of exogenous instruments (and includes xi1) and ´i is correlated
with ®i, but uncorrelated with uit;t ¸ 2. Using an orthogonal projection, it can be
written as
´i = µ®i + ui1 (10)
with ®i and ui1 independent of one another. It is also assumed (following Arulam-
palam et al., 2000) that ui1 satis…es the same distributional assumptions as uit for
t = 2;:::;T. The linearised reduced form for the latent variable for the initial time





i1¼ + µ®i + ui1 (11)
(i = 1;:::;N). The z-vector will include period 1 values of the x-variables together
with pre-sample variables. (Heckman (1991) also suggests using polynomial functions
of variable values in the pre-sample periods.) Parental variables and pre-…rst-wave
variables related to labour market entry are used below.
Since y is a binary variable, a normalisation is required. A convenient one is that
¾2
u = 1. If uit is normally distributed, the transition probability for individual i at
time t given ®i is given by
P [yitjxit;yit¡1;®i] = ©[(x
0
it¯ + °yit¡1 + ®i)(2yit ¡ 1)]: (12)
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0
i1¼ + µ®i)(2yi1 ¡ 1)]: (13)


















where F is the distribution function of ®¤ = ®=¾®. Under the normalisation used,
¾® can be written as ¾® =
q
½=(1 ¡ ½). If ® is taken to be normally distributed,
the integral over ®¤ can be evaluated using Gaussian–Hermite quadrature (Butler
and Mo¢tt, 1982). Maximum Likelihood estimates of the parameters of this model
applied to both the probability of being unemployed and the probability of being low
paid (given employment) are given in the Section 4.
73.2 GMM estimation of a dynamic LPM
A potential drawback to the dynamic random e¤ects probit model considered in the
previous sub-section is the possible sensitivity of its estimates to the auxiliary distri-
butional assumption on the individual-speci…c e¤ects. The model in this subsection
takes an alternative approach in the context of a linear probability model (LPM) and
uses a GMM estimator. The LPM is speci…ed as follows
yit = x
0
it¹ + ¸yit¡1 + fi + gt + !it (15)
for t = 2;:::;T and i = 1;:::;N. Di¤erencing removes the individual-speci…c e¤ects:
¢yit = ¢x
0
it¹ + ¸¢yit¡1 + ¢gt + ¢!it (16)
for t = 3;:::;T and i = 1;:::;N. Even if the !it are serially independent, ¢yit¡1 and
¢!it will be correlated and OLS applied to this di¤erenced equation will be biased
and inconsistent. A range of Instrumental Variable estimators have been proposed to
provide consistent estimation. The now commonly used Arellano and Bond (1991)
GMM estimator, involving a di¤erent number of instruments in each time period, is
based on the moment conditions
E(yit¡s¢!it) = 0; for t = 3;:::;T and s ¸ 2: (17)
This gives (T ¡1)(T ¡2)=2 orthogonality conditions in general and 10 in the current
context. This estimator provides e¢ciency gains over the simpler IV estimators pro-
posed by Anderson and Hsiao (1981), which use for example either yit¡2 or ¢yit¡2 to
instrument ¢yit¡1. However the results from using these estimators are also provided
for comparison in Section 4 below.
The consistency of all these estimators requires the !it to be serially uncorrelated.
Arellano and Bond (1991) propose a test on the second order residual correlation
coe¢cient which will be used to test this below, along with a Sargan test of the
over-identifying restrictions.
In situations where T is small and ¸ large the standard linear GMM estimator
described above has been found to have poor …nite sample properties. Lagged lev-
els provide weak instruments for …rst di¤erences in this case. Blundell and Bond
(1998) propose a “system” GMM estimator based on a stacked system compris-
ing the T ¡ 2 equations in …rst di¤erences together with the T ¡ 2 equations in
levels corresponding to periods 3;:::;T for which instruments are observed. The
Arellano-Bond instruments are used for the …rst-di¤erenced equations. The di¤er-
ences ¢yi2;:::;¢yiT¡1 are used as instruments for the levels equations as suggested
by Arellano and Bover (1995). This estimator encompasses the non-linear GMM es-
timator of Ahn and Schmidt (1995) and Blundell and Bond demonstrate that there
are substantial asymptotic e¢ciency gains relative to that estimator. Both stan-
dard Arellano-Bond GMM estimates and Blundell-Bond “system” GMM estimates
are presented in the next section.
4 Results
The dynamic random e¤ects probit model of Section 3.1 is applied separately to the
probability of being unemployed at t and the probability of being low paid at t (condi-
8tional on employment). The four probit models reported in Table 2 and described in
section 2 above are taken as the starting point of the analysis. The models reported
there ignore unobserved heterogeneity and initial conditions and hence are likely to
overstate the true state dependence in unemployment and low pay. GMM estimates
of the dynamic LPM are provided for comparative purposes.
4.1 The probability of unemployment
Estimates from the dynamic random e¤ects probit model for the probability of being
unemployed at t are given in Column 2 of Table 3. The x-vector is as used in Table 2.
The corresponding pooled probit model (without random e¤ects) estimated on the
same sample is given in the …rst column for comparison.
As indicated in the previous section, parental variables and pre-…rst-wave variables
related to labour market entry are used as instruments. The instruments used include
most of those used by Arulampalam et al. (2000), together with a number of additions.
Dummy variables for father’s broad SEG at the time the respondent was 14 are
included in z together with dummies for father not working and father deceased.
Similar variables in relation to the respondent’s mother at the same date are also
included. An indicator for whether or not the …rst labour market spell after leaving
full-time education was an employment spell is included. Dummy variables for the
broad SEG of the …rst job held (after leaving full-time education) are included. Also
included are an indicator of whether this …rst job was a temporary job (including
casual, seasonal and …xed contract jobs) and an indicator of whether the individual
left this …rst job due to redundancy. In the estimated linearised reduced form for the
initial condition this set of instruments (i.e. the variables in z excluding the period 1
values of the x variables) are jointly highly signi…cant.15
Care must be taken when comparing coe¢cient estimates across the columns in
Table 3. The dynamic random e¤ects probit model and the pooled probit model
involve di¤erent normalisations (see Arulampalam, 1999). The random e¤ects probit
coe¢cient estimates are normalised on ¾2
u = 1 (see section 3.1 above), while the
pooled probit coe¢cient estimates are normalised on ¾2
v = 1. To put it another way,
the random e¤ects probit estimation provides an estimate of °=¾u, whereas the pooled
probit estimation provides an estimate of °=¾v. Thus to make comparisons between
them the former needs to be multiplied by an estimate of ¾u=¾v =
p
1 ¡ ½. The
renormalised estimate of ° (the coe¢cient on unemployment at t¡1) in Column 2 of
Table 3 is 0.920. Thus, compared with the pooled probit estimate (without random
e¤ects and without allowance for initial conditions) in Column 1, the estimate of ° is
reduced by a half in the random e¤ects model, but remains strongly signi…cant.
Predicted conditional probabilities can be calculated for this model by a compa-
rable method to that used above for the pooled probit. Equation (12) in Section 3.1
gives the conditional probabilities given xit;yit¡1 and ®i. The probability that yit = 1
given yit¡1 = 0 (and xit;®i) is evaluated at the value of (x0
it¯ + ®i) that gives the
sample proportion given yit¡1 = 0, i.e. it is evaluated at ©¡1(p0). The predicted prob-
ability given yit¡1 = 1 is then given again by equation (2) and the ratio of conditional
probabilities, R, by equation (3). For the sample on which the model is estimated
15A Â2(13) Wald test statistic of 117.47, giving a p-value <0.0001.
9the ratio of raw conditional probabilities indicates that those unemployed at t ¡ 1
are 21 times as likely to be unemployed at t as those employed at t ¡ 1. Controlling
for the speci…ed observed heterogeneity in the pooled probit model reduces this to 19
times as likely. Controlling for initial conditions and unobserved, as well as observed,
heterogeneity cuts this measure of persistence by about a half. An individual with a
given set of characteristics (observed and unobserved) is about 9 times as likely to be
unemployed at t if they had been unemployed at t ¡ 1 as if they had been employed
at t ¡ 1.
The estimate of ½ is signi…cantly greater than zero and indicates that the corre-
lation between the composite error term in the latent equation in any two (di¤erent)
periods for the same individual is about 0.4. Equivalently this means that roughly
40% of the error variance is due to the individual-speci…c e¤ects. The hypothesis that
µ = 0, which corresponds to exogeneity of the initial condition is strongly rejected
(an asymptotic t-ratio of 6.65). Rather the estimate of µ is numerically close to, and
insigni…cantly di¤erent from, 1 (an asymptotic t-ratio of 0.32). The impact of these
individual e¤ects in the linearised reduced form for the latent variable for the initial
time period is not signi…cantly di¤erent from the impact in the structural form for
periods 2–6.16
The ratio of raw probabilities in the sample used here is about a quarter higher
than that in the sample in the …rst column of Table 2. This is primarily due to the
exclusion of those who were out of the labour force at an earlier date in the sample
period. 9% of those in the sample in Table 2 (waves 2–6) were not in the labour
force in wave 1. Excluding them raises the proportion of those unemployed at t ¡ 1
who were unemployed at t and lowers the proportion of those employed at t¡1 who
were unemployed at t, increasing the ratio from 17.0 to 18.5. A further 7% of the
observations in Table 2 are for people who were out of the labour force at one of the
waves between 2 and t. Excluding them as well further raises the proportion of those
unemployed at t ¡ 1 who were unemployed at t and further lowers the proportion of
those employed at t ¡ 1 who were unemployed at t, increasing the ratio to 20.8.17
Strictly the model must be estimated without prior gaps in the panel to give the
correct conditioning sequence. However to give an impression of the magnitude of
any selection bias from excluding those out of the labour force at an earlier wave,
column 3 of Table 3 adds the second group identi…ed above to the sample. (Being in
the labour force at wave 1 (so that the initial condition is de…ned) is retained as a
requirement for inclusion in the sample.) This results in only very slight changes in
parameter estimates and the ratio of predicted probabilities.
4.2 Continuing spells vs. repeat unemployment
Those who are unemployed at t¡1 and again at t consist of two rather di¤erent groups.
First there are those for whom the two points in time are part of a continuing spell
16Under the null hypothesis that µ = 1 the correlation between the period 1 reduced form error and
the error terms in periods 2–6 is the same as that between any two periods from 2 onwards (as given
in section 3 above). The implied correlation between v1 and vt for t ¸ 2 is given by µ½=
p
µ
2½ + 1 ¡ ½.
This model gives a value for this correlation of 0.40, as compared with 0.39 within periods 2–6.
17A further 0.5% are excluded due to having missing values on one of the instruments.
10without employment (possibly a single unemployment spell or possibly containing a
period out of the labour force). Second there are those who have an intervening spell
of employment (or possibly more than one), but then are unemployed again at t. This
second category is what might be labelled repeat unemployment.18
The implications of these two types of unemployment “persistence” are somewhat
di¤erent. In the case of continuing spells, R > 1 may simply re‡ect the fact that
employment spells tend to last much longer than unemployment spells. To illustrate
this consider the following simpli…ed situation. Denote the instantaneous conditional
probability of leaving unemployment (the unemployment hazard rate) by ¸u and that
for leaving employment by ¸e and suppose that there is no duration dependence in
either. Suppose further that there is at most one change of state between the two
dates being considered (which, for example, rules out repeat unemployment). Thus
someone unemployed at the start of the period either remains unemployed throughout
or gets a job at some point and then remains employed. Similarly someone employed
at the start of the period either remains employed throughout or loses their job at
some point and then remains unemployed.
In this case the conditional probabilities of being unemployed at t given unem-
ployed or employed at t ¡ 1 are
P(yit = 1jyit¡1 = 1) = exp(¡¸u)
P(yit = 1jyit¡1 = 0) =
¸e
¸u ¡ ¸e
[exp(¡¸e) ¡ exp(¡¸u)] (18)
The ratio of these two conditional probabilities, R, depends just on the two hazard
rates and hence on the mean completed durations of employment and unemployment.
To give a very simple numerical illustration, a mean completed employment duration
of 20 years and a mean completed unemployment duration of 1 year would give a
value of R of 12.0. Note that this value of R results despite there being no linkage at
all between spells, i.e. no impact of past history, and no duration dependence within
spells.
Thus the implications of continuing spells and repeat unemployment are very
di¤erent. However incorporating this distinction into the probability model used
above is not straightforward. One cannot for example simply partition the yit¡1
regressor. This would result in a “perfect classi…er”: yit¡1 = 1 and a continuing spell
implies yit = 1. One way to analyse this is to proceed as follows. De…ne a dummy
variable dit = 1 if individual i spends any time in employment between t ¡ 1 and t,
dit = 0 if not. Then
P[yit = 1jyit¡1] = P[yit = 1jyit¡1 = 0 or dit = 1]f1 ¡ P[dit = 0jyit¡1 = 1]g
+P[dit = 0jyit¡1 = 1] (19)
Thus the unemployment probabilities looked at in the previous subsection can be
decomposed by looking at models for P[yit = 1jyit¡1 = 0 or dit = 1] and
18Repeat unemployment as de…ned here requires a period of employment (however short) between
the two interview dates. Many of those unemployed at both t ¡ 1 and t have an intervening period
out of the labour force. Sweeney (1996) reports that a third of those leaving claimant unemployment
do not enter employment. Those with a period of unemployment that includes t ¡ 1, followed by a
period out of the labour force, followed by a period of unemployment that includes t are classi…ed
here as having a continuing spell. This contrasts with Arulampalam et al. (2000), who treat this
group as having separate spells.
11P[dit = 0jyit¡1 = 1]. Columns 4–6 of Table 3 give the results from estimating models
corresponding to those in Columns 1–3 excluding continuous unemployment spells.19
Considering …rst the model without random e¤ects, excluding those continuously
unemployed, i.e. those for whom the unemployment at t¡1 and t are part of the same
spell, reduces R from 19.3 to 6.2. The probit coe¢cient on yit¡1 is cut by roughly
half but remains highly signi…cant. Although the ratio is reduced, those unemployed
at t ¡ 1 who …nd a job are still more than 6 times as likely to be unemployed again
at t as those who were employed at t ¡ 1.
Turning to the model with unobserved heterogeneity, excluding those continu-
ously unemployed (i.e. without employment) between t ¡ 1 and t cuts the adjusted
estimate of ° by almost two-thirds, although again it remains signi…cantly greater
than zero.20 The ratio of predicted conditional probabilities, R, is reduced from 8.9
to 2.3. Someone unemployed at t ¡ 1 who …nds a job is still 2.3 times as likely to
be repeat unemployed at t as someone who was employed at t ¡ 1, but otherwise
has the same observed and unobserved (but …xed) characteristics. Excluding contin-
uing spells and allowing for the initial conditions considerably reduces the degree of
persistence exhibited, but it remains signi…cant.
4.3 GMM estimates of a dynamic LPM
The estimated e¤ects in the dynamic random e¤ects probit model used here are po-
tentially sensitive to the auxiliary distributional assumption for the individual-speci…c
e¤ects. To investigate this issue GMM estimates of a dynamic LPM as described in
Section 3.2 are also presented. The starting sample used is as in Column 2 of Table 3.
Column 1 of Table 4 gives the OLS estimates (with robust standard errors) of the
LPM for the probability of being unemployed at t. The control variables are as in
Table 3. The results for the LPM are, as expected, very similar to those for the probit
model on the same sample (once put on a comparable basis). The estimated value of
R is 20.6.
Column 2 gives the Arellano-Bond GMM estimator using only lagged unemploy-
ment variables as instruments.21 Column 3 gives the corresponding estimates using
as additional instruments the variables used in the Dynamic Random E¤ects probit
19Arulampalam et al. (2000) also provide estimates for a variant of their model with continuing
spells excluded, but de…ne continuation as an elapsed duration exceeding the length of time between
interviews. Thus those who leave the labour force and then return to unemployment are retained in
their sample. To identify “repeat unemployment”, unemployment at t ¡1 and t are de…ned here to
be part of a continuing spell if there was no period of employment between t ¡ 1 and t.
20Scaling by
p
1 ¡ ^ ½ gives an adjusted estimate of ° of 0.317, compared with an adjusted estimate
for Column 2 of 0.920. This sharp reduction contrasts with Arulampalam et al. (2000), who retain
those in a di¤erent unemployment spell but without any intervening employment and …nd a much
smaller fall. Corcoran and Hill (1980) …nd this data “overlap”, as they term it, to be an important
contributory factor to the aggregate persistence in the US. Once it and unobserved heterogeneity
are taken account of, their estimate of the equivalent of ° is insigni…cantly di¤erent from zero.
21The 1-step estimates are presented. Simulation evidence suggests the 2-step estimates can
perform poorly in hypothesis testing, particularly when the !it are heteroskedastic. Doornik et al.
(1999) advise that “inference based on asymptotic standard errors for the one-step estimators seems
to be more reliable”. For all the GMM columns in Table 4 the 2-step estimates and their standard
errors are very similar to the 1-step estimates presented.
12model in Table 3 and described above. Both models pass the Arellano-Bond test on
the second order residual correlation coe¢cient and the Sargan test of over-identifying
restrictions.22 The estimates in Column 3 imply an estimated value of R of 11.5. This
is slightly below half the value from the OLS estimation of the LPM on the same sam-
ple (t ¸ 3), a very similar proportional reduction to that with the dynamic random
e¤ects probit model.
Although the estimate of ¸ is not very large, alleviating worries about the weak-
instruments problem, results for the Blundell and Bond system GMM estimator are
given in Column 4 for comparative purposes. The estimates are fairly similar to
those in Column 2. Again the model passes the AR(2) and Sargan tests.23 In this
case however the Sargan test rejects the null hypothesis when the additional z-vector
instruments are added (results not shown), although the coe¢cient estimates are not
much altered.
The …nal two columns of the table give the results from the two Anderson-Hsiao
IV estimators described in Section 3.2 for comparison. The estimates of ¸ are fairly
similar to those in Column 2. However the AR(2) test rejects the null when the lagged
di¤erence is used as instrument. Since a single instrument is used, the model is just
identi…ed in both cases. Interestingly when the additional z-vector instruments are
added (results not shown), the Sargan test of the over-identifying restrictions is failed
in both cases. There are thus some doubts about the appropriateness of these two IV
estimators in the current context. Overall the evidence would seem to support the
use of the Arellano-Bond GMM estimator.
GMM estimation of a dynamic LPM produces estimates and evaluations of pre-
dicted probabilities fairly similar to those from the dynamic random e¤ects probit
model in Column 2 of Table 3. The results in this case do not seem to be driven by
the auxiliary distributional assumption on the random e¤ects.
The same conclusion appears to hold for the other columns of Table 3. Adding
those with labour force gaps to the sample as in Column 3 of Table 3 gives GMM
estimates which increase R to 12.1, a similar change to that based on the random
e¤ects probit estimates. Excluding those continuously unemployed between t¡1 and
t as in columns 4 and 5 of Table 3 produces OLS estimates that give ^ p1 = 0.140 and
R = 6.8 and a GMM estimates that give ^ p1 = 0.040 and R = 2.2, again very similar
to those based on the random e¤ects probit estimates.
22The assumption of no serial correlation in the !it is essential for consistency of the estimators
used. Tests for …rst and second order serial correlation in the …rst-di¤erenced residuals are reported.
If the !it are not serially correlated, there should be evidence of signi…cant negative …rst order
serial correlation in the di¤erenced residuals (^ !it ¡ ^ !it¡1) and no evidence of second order serial
correlation in the di¤erenced residuals. The test statistics presented are asymptotically N(0,1) under
the null hypothesis of no autocorrelation. The Sargan instrument-validity test presented is based on
the 2-step GMM estimator since only this version of the test is heteroskedasticity-consistent. (See
Arellano and Bond (1991) on both procedures.)
23The validity of the extra instruments in the Blundell-Bond system estimator can be tested
using the di¤erence between the Sargan test statistic for the system estimator and that for the
corresponding …rst-di¤erenced GMM estimator. This gives a Â2(4)-statistic of 5.37 and a p-value of
0.25. The validity of the extra instruments is supported here.
134.4 The impact of low pay
To examine the …rst component of the “low pay – no pay cycle”, Table 5 adds an
indicator variable for being low paid at t ¡ 1 to the models presented in Table 3.
In Table 3 the base group for status at t ¡ 1 is the employed. In this table those
self-employed at t ¡1 are excluded and employees at t¡1 are partitioned into those
low paid and those paid above the threshold, with the latter group becoming the base
group. The x- and z-variables are exactly as used in the models presented in Table 3.
Low pay at t ¡ 1 is treated as endogenous, i.e. correlated with ®, and instrumented
in the same way as unemployment at t ¡ 1.
Looking …rst at the results in Columns 1 and 2, the introduction of unobserved
heterogeneity and allowance for initial conditions reduces the ratio of predicted prob-
abilities, R, for those unemployed at t¡1 relative to those employed but low paid at
t ¡ 1, evaluated as in Section 4.1, by a half (from 11.7 to 5.7).
The corresponding ratio for those low paid at t¡1 relative to those higher paid at
t ¡1 remains unchanged. An individual with a given set of characteristics (observed
and unobserved) is about 6 times as likely to be unemployed at t if they had been
unemployed at t¡1 as if they had been a low paid employee at t¡1 and about twice
as likely in this latter case as if they had been a higher paid employee at t ¡ 1.
The estimates of ½ and µ are fairly similar to those in Table 3, exogeneity of
the initial condition (µ = 0) is strongly rejected (asymptotic t-ratio of 5.65) and the
hypothesis that µ = 1 is not rejected (asymptotic t-ratio of 0.57). Also as in Table 3,
the informal examination of the selection bias from excluding those out of the labour
force at an earlier wave (Table 5, Column 3) suggests this is relatively minor.
Columns 4–6 of Table 5 give the corresponding results after excluding continuous
unemployment spells. The ratio of predicted conditional probabilities, R, unemployed
relative to low paid, is reduced from 5.7 to 1.7. Someone unemployed at t ¡ 1 who
…nds a job is 1.7 times as likely to be repeat unemployed at t as someone who was an
employee on low pay at t ¡ 1, but otherwise has the same observed and unobserved
(but …xed) characteristics. This latter person is in turn 1.7 times as likely as someone
who was higher paid. In terms of predicting subsequent unemployment, low paid
employment holds a position roughly half way between previous (but not continuous)
unemployment and higher paid employment.24
However the coe¢cients on the indicator variables for being unemployed at t ¡
1 and being low paid at t ¡ 1 are not signi…cantly di¤erent from one another at
conventional signi…cance levels. The Wald test of their equality gives a Â2(1) statistic
of 1.97, implying a p-value of 0.16.25 Although someone unemployed at t ¡ 1 who
…nds a job is almost twice as likely to be unemployed again at t as someone low paid
at t¡1, the di¤erence is not statistically signi…cant. One cannot reject the hypothesis
that the adverse e¤ects of being unemployed at t¡1 and of being low paid at t¡1 on
the probability of being unemployed at t (excluding those continuously unemployed)
24There is some evidence in Column 6 of a downward bias in the coe¢cient on low paid at t ¡ 1
from excluding those out of the labour force at an earlier wave. In the model in Column 6 low paid
at t ¡ 1 is much closer to unemployed at t ¡ 1 than it is to higher paid at t ¡ 1.
25This test statistic halves (and the p-value doubles) in the …nal column of the table where those
out of the labour force at an earlier wave are added to the sample.
14are equal to one another.
Corresponding GMM estimates of the dynamic LPM are given in Table 6. In
general the GMM estimates give rise to increased predicted probabilities given either
low pay at t ¡ 1 or unemployment at t ¡ 1. For example in Column 2 the predicted
probability given low pay at t¡1 is double that from the random e¤ects probit model
(Table 5, Column 2) and that given unemployment at t ¡ 1 is up 50% on Table 5.
This results in the ratio of predicted probabilities for low pay relative to higher pay
more than doubling and the ratio for unemployment relative to low pay falling by
about a third.
In Column 5 after those continuously unemployed between t ¡ 1 and t have been
excluded, again the predicted probabilities given low pay at t¡1 and unemployment
at t¡1 are both higher than in the corresponding column of Table 5, particularly in
the case of low pay. The predicted probability given low pay at t¡1 has moved closer
to that given unemployment at t ¡ 1. On the basis of the GMM estimates, someone
unemployed at t¡1 who …nds a job is 1.3 times as likely to be repeat unemployed at
t as someone who was an employee on low pay at t ¡ 1, but otherwise has the same
observed and unobserved (but …xed) characteristics. This latter person is in turn 3.3
times as likely as someone who was higher paid. In terms of predicting subsequent
unemployment, the results of Table 5 indicate that low paid employment holds a
position roughly half way between previous (but not continuous) unemployment and
higher paid employment. The GMM estimates in Table 6 shift this position to about
two-thirds of the way towards unemployment.
Another potential explanation for the results in this subsection on the di¤erences
in the conditional probability of unemployment at t between those low paid and those
higher paid at t¡1 needs to be considered. This di¤erence could re‡ect a di¤erence
in elapsed job duration at time t ¡ 1 if the low paid typically have shorter elapsed
durations than the higher paid and if the probability of job loss is greater for those
with shorter durations.
This competing hypothesis is tested by adding to each of the models in Table 5
a variable measuring, for those employed at t ¡ 1, the length of time they have been
in their jobs as at time t ¡ 1. This variable is treated as endogenous, i.e. correlated
with ®, and instrumented in the same way as unemployed at t ¡ 1 and low paid at
t ¡ 1. It has a signi…cant negative e¤ect on the probability of being unemployed at
t, but its inclusion alters the coe¢cients on unemployment at t ¡ 1 and low paid at
t ¡ 1 very little. In Column 5 the coe¢cient on unemployed at t ¡ 1 falls to .403
(.146) and that on low paid at t¡1 falls to .195 (.106). The corresponding predicted
probabilities also fall only very slightly, reducing both ratios, unemployed to low paid
and low paid to higher paid, to 1.6. Similarly in Column 6 these coe¢cients fall to
.414 (.109) and .314 (.088) and the ratios to 1.2 and 2.1. Thus di¤erences in elapsed
job duration are not responsible for the low pay e¤ects reported in Table 5.
4.5 Low pay as a conduit to repeat unemployment
For those who experience repeat unemployment in the sense examined above, the
BHPS unfortunately does not provide information on the hourly rate of pay of the
job(s) held between the unemployment at t¡1 and again at t. An alternative way to
15investigate this involves looking at the persistence over a 2-year rather than a 1-year
period. In this way, for those unemployed at t ¡ 2 and employed at t ¡ 1 the impact
of their pay level at t ¡ 1 on their probability of repeat unemployment at t can be
estimated.26
Estimates of models for the probability of being low paid at t based on alternate
waves (speci…cally waves 1, 3 and 5) are given in Table 7. Columns 1 and 2 give
estimates for the equivalent speci…cation to Table 3: yit determined by xit and yit¡2.
Column 2 gives the dynamic random e¤ects probit estimates and Column 1 gives
the pooled probit estimates on the same sample. As might be expected, the degree
of measured persistence falls considerably when considered over two years rather
than one. The estimates in Column 2 indicate that someone with a given set of
characteristics (observed and unobserved) is 4.5 times as likely to be unemployed at
t if they had been unemployed at t ¡ 2 as if they had been employed at t ¡ 2.
Columns 3 and 4 of Table 7 then partition this e¤ect according to status at t¡1.
The two categories reported are for those low paid at t ¡1 and for those higher paid
at t¡1. Indicator variables are also included for those self-employed or with missing
earnings information and for those unemployed or out of the labour force at t ¡ 1.
This latter group will include any continuing spells (as well as others) and so remove
them from the base group. A further indicator variable is also included for those
employed at t¡2 and unemployed at t¡1.27 This means that the base group is those
employed at both t ¡ 2 and t ¡ 1 to give the required comparison. The comparison
is thus of those unemployed at t ¡ 2 and employed at t ¡ 1 with those employed at
t ¡ 2 and t ¡ 1.
There is a signi…cant positive e¤ect on the probability of unemployment at t of
being low paid at t ¡ 1 after unemployment at t ¡ 2, but an insigni…cant (negative
but numerically small) e¤ect of being higher paid at t¡1. An individual unemployed
at t ¡ 2 and employed on low pay at t ¡ 1 is 3.8 times as likely to be unemployed
at t as someone with the same set of characteristics (observed and unobserved), but
employed at t ¡ 2 and t ¡ 1. In contrast someone employed on higher pay at t ¡ 1
after being unemployed at t ¡ 2 has the same probability of being unemployed at t
as someone employed at t ¡ 2 and t ¡ 1.
As in the previous subsection, the possibility that this di¤erence between low and
higher pay re‡ects a di¤erence in elapsed job duration should be addressed. Those
higher paid at t¡1 may have got their jobs earlier subsequent to the unemployment
at t¡2 than those whose job at t¡1 is low paid. This hypothesis is tested by adding
to the models reported in Columns 3 and 4 of Table 7 a variable measuring, for those
unemployed at t ¡ 2 and employed at t ¡ 1, the length of time they have been in
their jobs as at time t ¡ 1 (and treating it as endogenous). Its e¤ect is insigni…cant
in both cases (t-statistics of 0.78 and -0.29 respectively) and its inclusion has little
e¤ect on the coe¢cients on low and higher paid at t¡1.28 The corresponding ratios
26This also provides an alternative approach to the problem of continuing spells, the proportion
of which is much reduced when the length between observation points is increased from one year to
two.
27All the indicator variables listed in this paragraph are treated as endogenous and instrumented
in the same way as yt¡2.
28In the model of Column 3 the coe¢cient on low paid at t ¡1 is 1.080 (.290) and that on higher
paid is .455 (.238). In the model of Column 4 the coe¢cient on low paid at t¡1 is .594 (.381) and
16of predicted probabilities also change relatively little. In Column 3 to 8.3 and 2.8, in
Column 4 to 3.5 and 1.1. Thus di¤erences in elapsed job durations at t ¡ 1 are not
responsible for these e¤ects.
There is an increased probability of being unemployed again at t having been so
at t ¡ 2 if the intervening point at t ¡ 1 was one of low paid employment, but not
if it was one of higher paid employment.29 Low paid jobs act as a conduit to repeat
unemployment. Higher paid jobs eliminate the increased risk.
4.6 The probability of being low paid
To complete the picture estimates of models for the probability of being low paid are
given in Table 8. Estimation of the dynamic random e¤ects probit model (Column 2)
cuts the ratio of predicted probabilities, R, by three-quarters. Without controlling
for unobserved heterogeneity or initial conditions those low paid at t¡1 are 17 times
as likely to be low paid at t as those higher paid at t¡1. However an individual with
a given set of characteristics (observed and unobserved) is about 4 times as likely to
be low paid at t if they had been low paid at t¡1 as if they had been higher paid at
t ¡ 1.
The estimate of ½ is signi…cantly greater than zero and indicates that the corre-
lation between the composite error term in the latent equation in any two (di¤erent)
periods for the same individual is about 0.6, i.e. that 60% of the error variance is
due to the individual-speci…c e¤ects. The estimate of µ is (as for unemployment) sig-
ni…cantly di¤erent from zero (t-statistic of 7.22) and insigni…cantly di¤erent from 1
(t-statistic of 0.97).
The ratio of raw probabilities in the sample used here is somewhat higher than
that in the sample in Column 3 of Table 2. This is primarily due to the exclusion of
those who were not employees at one (or more) of the earlier interview dates. Strictly
the model must be estimated without prior gaps in the panel, as pointed out above.
However, to give an impression of the magnitude of any selection bias from excluding
those not employees at an earlier wave, column 3 adds those not employees at one
of the waves between 2 and t. (The requirement of being an employee at wave 1 has
to be retained.) Like in the case of unemployment, this raises the ratio of predicted
probabilities only slightly.
that on higher paid is .046 (.329).
29The equivalent GMM estimation of the dynamic LPM, since T=3, involves estimation of the
di¤erenced equation (16) on a single cross-section and with a single instrument (it is equivalent to
the Anderson-Hsiao IV estimator with yit¡2 as instrument). There is thus no possibility to test the
essential serial correlation restriction. A better approach involves GMM estimation on waves 4–6 of
the di¤erenced equation with suitable interactions between yt¡2, yt¡1 and low pay status at t¡1 to
match the construction above. This gives a coe¢cient on “unemployed at t¡2, higher paid at t¡1”
of 0.019 with a standard error of 0.024. Thus again insigni…cantly di¤erent from zero (an asymptotic
t–statistic of 0.77). The model passes both the serial correlation and Sargan tests. The predicted
probabilities are 0.017 for the base group, 0.035 for unemployed at t ¡ 2 and then higher paid at
t ¡ 1 (implying R = 2.1) and 0.094 for unemployed at t ¡ 2 and then low paid at t ¡1 (implying R
= 5.6). The predicted probability for those unemployed at t ¡ 2 and then higher paid at t ¡ 1 from
applying OLS to the same sample (waves 4–6) is 0.093. Thus GMM estimation on waves 4–6 gives
a very similar proportional reduction in ^ p1 to Dynamic Random E¤ects Probit estimation on waves
1,3,5 (Columns 3 and 4 of Table 7).
17Columns 4 and 5 of Table 8 examine the second component of the “low pay – no
pay cycle” by adding those unemployed at t ¡ 1 to the sample and incorporating an
indicator variable for this group in the model. The probability being modelled is that
of being low paid (given an employee). Hence those unemployed at t are excluded
from the sample used for estimation. Thus in the sample of individuals without prior
gaps those unemployed at t ¡ 1 would be excluded and the e¤ect sought here would
not be estimable. Hence this model must be estimated on the sample that includes
those with prior gaps, i.e. those who were unemployed rather than an employee at one
(or more) of the waves between 2 and t. This means that the estimates in Column 5
should be compared with those in Column 3. The (adjusted) coe¢cient on low pay
at t ¡ 1 and the ratio of predicted probabilities (low paid at t ¡ 1 to higher paid at
t ¡ 1) are very similar to those in column 3, which excludes these extra observations
(as are those for the pooled probit without the random e¤ects).
The coe¢cient on unemployed at t ¡ 1 and the ratio of predicted probabilities
(unemployed at t¡1 to higher paid at t¡1) are slightly higher than those for low pay
at t ¡ 1. This represents a turn round in the relative importance of unemployment
and low pay at t¡1 compared with the pooled probit model without random e¤ects
in Column 4. However the coe¢cients on low pay at t¡1 and unemployment at t¡1
are not signi…cantly di¤erent from one another: a Â2(1) statistic of 0.45, giving a
p-value of 0.50. As far as the probability of being low paid at t is concerned someone
with a given set of characteristics (observed and unobserved) would be in the same
position if they were low paid at t ¡ 1 and if they were unemployed at t ¡ 1. One
cannot reject the hypothesis that the adverse e¤ects of being unemployed at t¡1 and
of being low paid at t¡1 on the probability of being low paid at t (given employment)
are equal to one another.30
5 Conclusions
This paper examines the extent of state dependence in individual unemployment and
low paid employment and the inter-related dynamics between the two. The main
…ndings of the paper are as follows:
² The aggregate persistence in unemployment considerably overstates an individ-
ual’s risk of repeat unemployment. Over half the measured persistence results
from continuing unemployment spells (in the sense of there being no intervening
employment) and about a third is removed when unobserved heterogeneity and
initial conditions are taken account of. Despite this, an individual unemployed
at t ¡ 1 who …nds a job is still 2.3 times as likely to be unemployed again at t
as someone who was employed at t ¡ 1, but otherwise has the same observed
and unobserved characteristics; and this di¤erence is statistically signi…cant.
² Low pay at t¡1 has almost as large an adverse e¤ect as unemployment at t¡1
on both the probability of employment at t and the probability of being paid
30A caveat to the results of this subsection is that they ignore any selection bias from the necessary
conditioning on employment when modelling the probability of being low paid, i.e. they ignore the
possible correlation between the error terms in the latent equations for unemployment and low pay.
18above the threshold if employed. The di¤erence between the e¤ects of past low
pay and past unemployment is statistically insigni…cant in both cases.
² Low paid jobs act as the main conduit for repeat unemployment. Those who
manage to get a better job eliminate their increased risk of repeat unemploy-
ment. The probability of re-entering unemployment for someone who gets a
low paid job after a spell of unemployment is about four times greater than for
someone with the same observed and unobserved characteristics originally in
employment. The equivalent person who gets a higher paid job after the spell
of unemployment has the same probability of becoming unemployed again as
the person originally in employment.
In terms of future prospects (the probability of employment and the probability of
being paid above the threshold if employed), low paid jobs are closer to unemployment
than to higher paid jobs. The results in this paper cast doubt on the belief that all
jobs are “good” jobs in the sense of improving future prospects. The results suggest
that low paid jobs typically do not lead on to better things.
The policy objective, rather than simply being to get an unemployed individual
into any job, should be to get him or her into a “good” job, one with improved
future prospects. Typically low paid jobs are not “good” jobs in this sense. The
results of the paper are consistent with the hypothesis that a low paid job does
not augment a person’s human capital signi…cantly more than unemployment. If
unemployed individuals’ employment prospects are to be permanently improved, they
need to gain access to jobs where they can augment their skills, raise their productivity
and move up the pay ladder.
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22TABLE 1




Out of labour force at t ¡ 1 .369 .406
In labour force at t ¡ 1 .053 .091
Unemployed at t ¡ 1 .457 .258
Employed at t ¡ 1 .027 .085
Ratio 16.8 3.0
Employee at t ¡ 1 .027 .084
Employee at t ¡ 1, non-missing earnings .026 .083
Low paid at t ¡ 1 .059 .569
Higher paid at t ¡ 1 .022 .034
Ratio 2.7 16.8
Sample size 25,565 17,912
Notes:
1. Pooled data for BHPS waves 2 to 6.
2. Column 1 gives P(U)t, the probability of being unemployed at t.
3. ILO/OECD de…nition of unemployment used.
4. Sample in column 1 restricted to those in the labour force (i.e. employed or unemployed) at t.
5. Column 2 gives P(L)t, the probability of being low paid at t given an employee.
6. Low pay threshold is £3.50 in April 1997 terms (adjusted using the Average Earnings Index).
7. Sample in column 2 restricted to those who are employees with non-missing pay data at t.
8. Sample sizes given are for the unconditional probabilities.
23TABLE 2
Probit Models for Unemployment and Low Pay Probabilities
(Pooled data 1992–1996)
P(U)t P(L)t
1 2 3 4
ML coe¢cient estimates
Unemployed at t ¡ 1 1.723 1.806 1.144
(.040) (.042) (.065)
Low paid at t ¡ 1 .395 1.765 1.759
(.060) (.042) (.042)
Predicted probabilities:
Unemployed at t ¡ 1 .420 .420 .247
Employed at t ¡ 1 .027
Higher paid at t ¡ 1 .053 .475 .473
Low paid at t ¡ 1 .022 .034 .034
Ratio of predicted probabilities, R
Unemployed to employed 15.5
Unemployed to low paid 7.9 0.5
Low paid to higher paid 2.4 14.1 14.0
Ratio of raw probabilities on same sample
Unemployed to employed 17.0
Unemployed to low paid 8.3 0.5
Low paid to higher paid 2.5 16.9 16.9
Sample size 22,598 17,821 15,043 15,592
Notes:
1. Pooled data for waves 2 to 6.
2. Standard errors in brackets.
3. Columns 1 and 2 give results for the probability of unemployment at t (given in the labour force).
4. Columns 3 and 4 give results for the probability of low pay at t (given employee).
5. Unemployment and low pay de…nitions as in Table 1.
6. Each Probit model also contains years of education, whether individual has any quali…cations,
years of experience (quadratic), gender and marital status (and the interaction between them),
health status, whether resident in London or the South East and the local unemployment-vacancy
ratio.
24TABLE 3
Dynamic Random E¤ects Probit Models for the
Probability of Being Unemployed at t
(Panel data, t = 1992–1996)
1 2 3 4 5 6
Unemployed at t ¡ 1 1.861 1.176 1.210 .900 .374 .352
(.049) (.093) (.083) (.082) (.130) (.109)
Random e¤ects No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
½ 0 .388 .355 0 .281 .252
(.051) (.047) (.063) (.056)
µ 1.051 1.066 .882 1.023
(.158) (.163) (.250) (.277)
Sample:
Required to be in labour force
in all waves? Yes Yes No Yes Yes No
Exclude those continuously unemployed
between t ¡ 1 and t? No No No Yes Yes Yes
Predicted probabilities:
p0 .023 .023 .024 .021 .021 .021
^ p1 .448 .207 .222 .127 .048 .047
Ratio, R 19.3 8.9 9.2 6.2 2.3 2.2
Predicted probabilities from simple probit on same sample:
^ p1 .448 .435 .127 .111
Ratio, R 19.3 18.0 6.2 5.2
Sample size: waves 2–6 18,752 18,752 19,796 18,145 18,145 19,365
total 18,752 23,491 24,715 18,145 22,745 24,199
Notes:
1. Pooled data for waves 2 to 6.
2. Standard errors in brackets.
3. Unemployment and low pay de…nitions as in Table 2.
4. Other variables in models as in Table 2.
5. Speci…cation of z-vector (including instruments) as described in text.
25TABLE 4
GMM Estimation of Dynamic LPM for the
Probability of Being Unemployed at t
(Panel data, t = 1992–1996)
1 2 3 4 5 6
Unemployed at t ¡ 1 .455 .216 .214 .224 .208 .191
(.020) (.013) (.028) (.028) (.014) (.033)
Method of estimation OLS GMM GMM GMM IV IV
Instrument set A A,Z B yt¡2 ¢yt¡2
Test statistics:
AR(1) (N(0,1)) -3.95 -42.0 -12.0 -13.9 -44.6 -19.1
AR(2) (N(0,1)) 3.78 0.90 0.47 0.58 0.78 2.42
Sargan (Â2(d)) 4.70 25.38 10.07
(deg. of freedom.(d)) (9) (22) (13)
[p–value] [.86] [.28] [.69]
Predicted probabilities:
p0 .023 .020 .020 .021 .020 .019
^ p1 .478 .237 .235 .245 .228 .210
Ratio, R 20.6 11.6 11.5 11.6 11.1 11.1
Predicted probability from OLS on same sample:
^ p1 .482 .482 .463 .482 .470
Ratio, R 23.5 23.5 21.8 23.5 25.0
Sample size 18,752 14,013 14,013 18,067 14,013 9,959
Notes:
1. Pooled data for waves 2 to 6.
2. Robust standard errors in all columns.
3. Unemployment de…nition as in Table 2.
4. Other variables in models as in Table 2.
5. Instrument sets: A = Arellano-Bond, B = Blundell-Bond, Z = instruments used in Random
E¤ects Probit model in Table 3, as described in text.
26TABLE 5
Dynamic Random E¤ects Probit Models for the
Probability of Being Unemployed at t
(Panel data, t = 1992–1996)
1 2 3 4 5 6
Unemployed at t ¡ 1 1.961 1.303 1.456 .995 .470 .470
(.055) (.113) (.078) (.088) (.146) (.109)
Low paid at t ¡ 1 .294 .301 .404 .232 .227 .340
(.082) (.102) (.083) (.089) (.107) (.088)
Random e¤ects No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
½ 0 .374 .271 0 .282 .240
(.065) (.049) (.075) (.061)
µ 1.113 1.263 .941 1.073
(.197) (.252) (.305) (.329)
Sample:
Required to be in labour force
in all waves? Yes Yes No Yes Yes No
Exclude those continuously unemployed
between t ¡ 1 and t? No No No Yes Yes Yes
Predicted probabilities:
Higher paid at t ¡ 1 .020 .020 .021 .019 .019 .019
Low paid at t ¡ 1 .040 .040 .051 .032 .032 .041
Unemployed at t ¡ 1 .465 .228 .279 .138 .053 .054
Ratio: Unemp to LP 11.7 5.7 5.5 4.3 1.7 1.3
Ratio: LP to HP 2.0 2.0 2.5 1.7 1.7 2.2
Test of equality of coe¢cients on Unemp and LP:
Â2(1) Wald statistic 48.38 96.86 1.97 0.95
[p–value] [.00] [.00] [.16] [.33]
Sample size: waves 2–6 13,506 13,506 15,723 13,016 13,016 15,309
total 13,506 17,229 19,994 13,016 16,607 19,494
Notes:
1. Pooled data for waves 2 to 6.
2. Standard errors in brackets.
3. Unemployment and low pay de…nitions as in Table 2.
4. Other variables in models as in Table 2.
5. Speci…cation of z-vector (including instruments) as described in text.
27TABLE 6
GMM Estimation of Dynamic LPM for the
Probability of Being Unemployed at t
(Panel data, t = 1992–1996)
1 2 3 4 5 6
Unemployed at t ¡ 1 .478 .315 .349 .134 .050 .064
(.022) (.041) (.043) (.022) (.027) (.030)
Low paid at t ¡ 1 .018 .074 .086 .013 .036 .045
(.007) (.014) (.014) (.006) (.010) (.010)
Method of estimation OLS GMM GMM OLS GMM GMM
Sample:
Required to be in labour force
in all waves? Yes Yes No Yes Yes No
Exclude those continuously unemployed
between t ¡ 1 and t? No No No Yes Yes Yes
Test statistics:
AR(1) (N(0,1)) -2.53 -9.80 -9.92 0.42 -7.96 -8.68
AR(2) (N(0,1)) 3.37 1.11 1.09 1.96 1.34 1.17
Sargan (Â2(d)) 4.05 4.84 9.74 11.66
(deg. of freedom.(d)) (9) (9) (9) (9)
[p–value] [.91] [.85] [.37] [.23]
Predicted probabilities:
Higher paid at t ¡ 1 .020 .017 .018 .019 .016 .017
Low paid at t ¡ 1 .038 .092 .104 .031 .051 .061
Unemployed at t ¡ 1 .499 .333 .367 .153 .066 .081
Ratio: Unemp to LP 13.0 3.6 3.5 4.8 1.3 1.3
Ratio: LP to HP 1.9 5.3 5.7 1.7 3.3 3.7
Sample size 13,506 9,783 10,797 13,016 9,425 10,488
Notes:
1. Pooled data for waves 2 to 6.
2. Robust standard errors in all columns.
3. Unemployment de…nition as in Table 2.
4. Other variables in models as in Table 2.
5. GMM estimates with Arellano-Bond instrument set.
28TABLE 7
Dynamic Random E¤ects Probit Models for the
Probability of Being Unemployed at t
(Panel data for alternate waves only: 1991, 93, 95)
1 2 3 4
Unemployed at t ¡ 2 1.442 .769
(.072) (.214)
Unemployed at t ¡ 2 and:
low paid at t ¡ 1 1.083 .635
(.269) (.336)
higher paid at t ¡ 1 .479 -.018
(.182) (.272)






Employed at t ¡ 2 (base group) .030 .030 .023 .023
Unemployed at t ¡ 2 .328 .132
Unemployed at t ¡ 2 (then LP) .180 .086
Unemployed at t ¡ 2 (then HP) .064 .022
Ratios of predicted probabilities:
Unemployed to employed 11.1 4.5
Unemp (then LP) to employed 7.9 3.8
Unemp (then HP) to employed 2.8 1.0
Sample size: waves>1 7,626 7,626 7,626 7,626
total 7,626 11,804 7,626 11,804
Notes:
1. Data for alternate waves only: t = 1993, 95.
2. Standard errors in brackets.
3. Unemployment and low pay de…nitions as in Table 2.
4. Other variables in models as in Table 2.
5. Speci…cation of z-vector (including instruments) as described in text.
6. Also included in Columns 3 and 4 (and treated as endogenous) are indicator variables for un-
employed at t ¡ 2 interacted with self-employment or missing earnings at t ¡ 1 and interacted with
unemployed at t ¡ 1, plus one for employed at t ¡ 2 and unemployed at t ¡ 1.
29TABLE 8
Dynamic Random E¤ects Probit Models for the
Probability of Being Low Paid at t
(Panel data, t = 1992–1996)
1 2 3 4 5
Low paid at t ¡ 1 1.817 .645 .812 1.781 .823
(.053) (.089) (.085) (.050) (.085)
Unemployed at t ¡ 1 .959 .948
(.129) (.170)
Random e¤ects No Yes Yes No Yes
½ 0 .604 .539 0 .525
(.033) (.039) (.039)
µ 1.155 1.241 1.287
(.160) (.186) (.197)
Sample includes those not continuously
employed? No No Yes Yes Yes
Predicted probabilities:
Higher paid at t ¡ 1 .027 .027 .029 .029 .029
Low paid at t ¡ 1 .458 .101 .141 .457 .143
Unemployed at t ¡ 1 .176 .173
Ratio: LP to HP 16.8 3.7 4.8 15.5 4.9
Ratio: Unemp to HP 6.0 5.9
Ratios from simple probits on same sample:
LP to HP 16.8 15.6 15.5
Unemp to HP 6.0
Test of equality of coe¢cients on Unemp and LP:
Â2(1) Wald statistic 37.56 0.45
[p–value] [.00] [.50]
Sample size: waves 2–6 11,425 11,425 12,380 12,534 12,534
total 11,425 14,505 15,688 12,534 15,865
Notes:
1. See notes to Table 3.
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